The Constitution made applicable to adversary criminal trials. Read the definition of "adversary"!

IN RE GAULT 387 U.S. 1; 18 L. Ed. 2d 527; 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967) Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. . . . On Monday, June 8, 1965, at about 10 a.m., Gerald Francis Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were taken into custody by the Sheriff of Gila County. Gerald was then still subject to a six months' probation order which had been entered on February 25, 1964, as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a lady's purse. The police action on June 8 was taken as the result of a verbal complaint by a neighbor of the boys, Mrs. Cook, about a telephone call made to her in which the caller or callers made lewd or indecent remarks. It will suffice for purposes of this opinion to say that the remarks or questions put to her were of the irritatingly, offensive, adolescent, sex variety. At the time Gerald was picked up, his mother and father were both at work. No notice that Gerald was being taken into custody was left at the home. No other steps were taken to advise them that their son had, in effect, been arrested. Gerald was taken to the Children's Detention Home. When his mother arrived home at about 6 o'clock, Gerald was not there. Gerald's older brother was sent to look for him at the trailer home of the Lewis family. He apparently learned then that Gerald was in custody: He so informed his mother. The two of them went to the Detention Home. The deputy probation officer, Flagg, who was also superintendent of the Detention Home, told Mrs. Gault "why Jerry was there" and said that a hearing would be held in Juvenile Court at 3 o'clock the following day, June 9. Officer Flagg filed a petition with the court on the hearing day, June 9, 1964. It was not served on the Gaults. Indeed, none of them saw this petition until the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, 1964. The petition was entirely formal. It made no reference to any factual basis for the judicial action which it initiated. It recited only that "said minor is under the age of eighteen years and is in need of the protection of this Honorable court; [and that] said minor is a delinquent minor;" It prayed for a hearing and an order regarding "the care and custody of said minor." Officer Flagg executed a formal affidavit in support of the petition. On June 9, Gerald, his mother, his older brother, and Probation Officers Flagg and Henderson appeared before the Juvenile Judge in chambers. Gerald's father was not there. He was at work out of the city. Mrs. Cook, the complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at this hearing. No transcript or recording was made. No memorandum or record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared. Our information about the proceedings and the subsequent hearing on June 15, derives entirely from the testimony of the Juvenile Court Judge, Mr. and Mrs. Gault and Officer Flagg at the habeas corpus proceeding conducted two months later. From this, it appears that at the June 9 hearing Gerald was questioned by the judge about the telephone call. There was conflict as to what he said. His mother recalled that Gerald said he only dialed Mrs. Cook's number and handed the telephone to his friend, Ronald. Officer Flagg recalled that Gerald had admitted making the lewd remarks. Judge McGhee testified that Gerald "admitted making one of these [lewd] statements." At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge said he would "think about it." Gerald was taken back to the Detention Home. He was not sent to his own home with his parents. On June 11 or 12, after having been detained since June 8, Gerald was released and driven home. There is no explanation in the record as to why he was kept in the Detention Home or why he was released. At 5 p.m. on the day of Gerald's release, Mrs. Gault received a note signed by Officer Flagg. It was on plain paper, not letterhead. Its entire text was as follows: Mrs. Gault: Judge McGhee has set Monday, June 15, 1964 at 11:00 a.m. as the date and time for further Hearings on Gerald's delinquency. /s/Flagg At the appointed time on Monday, June 15, Gerald, his father and mother, Ronald Lewis and his father, and Officer Flagg and Henderson were present before Judge McGhee. Witnesses at the habeas corpus proceeding differed in their recollections of Gerald's testimony at the June 15 hearing. Mr. and Mrs. Gault recalled that Gerald again testified that he had only dialed the number and that the other boy had made the remarks. Officer Flagg agreed that at this hearing Gerald did not admit making the lewd remarks. But Judge McGhee recalled that "there was some admission again of some of the lewd statements. He -- he didn't admit any of the more serious lewd statements." Again, the complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not present. Mrs. Gault asked that Mrs. Cook be present "so she could see which boy that done the talking, the dirty talking over the phone." The Juvenile Judge said "she didn't have to be present at that hearing." The judge did not speak to Mrs. Cook or communicate with her at any time. Probation Officer Flagg had talked to her once--over the telephone on June 9. At this June 15 hearing a "referral report" made by the probation officers was filed with the court, although not disclosed to Gerald or his parents. This listed the charge as "Lewd Phone Calls." At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School "for the period of his minority [that is, until 21] unless sooner discharged by due process of law." . . . No appeal is permitted by Arizona law in juvenile cases. On August 3, 1964, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court of Arizona and referred by it to the Superior Court for hearing. At the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, Judge McGhee was vigorously cross-examined as to the basis for his actions. He testified that he had taken into account the fact that Gerald was on probation. He was asked "under what section of . . . the code you found the boy delinquent." His answer is set forth in the margin. In substance, he concluded that Gerald came within ARS 8-201-6(a), which specifies that a "delinquent child" includes one "who has violated a law of the state or an ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision thereof." The law which Gerald was found to have violated . . . provides that a person who "in the presence of hearing of any woman or child . . . uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor. . ." The penalty specified in the Criminal Code, which would apply to an adult, is $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months. The judge also testified that he acted under ARS 8-201-6(d) which includes in the definition of a "delinquent child" one who, as the judge phrased it, is "habitually involved in immoral matters." Asked about this basis for his conclusion that Gerald was "habitually involved in immoral matters," the judge testified, somewhat vaguely, that two years earlier, on July 2, 1962, a "referral" was made concerning Gerald, "where the boy had stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied to the Police Department about it." The judge said there was "no hearing," and "no accusation" relating to this incident, "because of lack of material foundation." But it seems to have remained in his mind as a relevant factor. The judge also testified that Gerald had admitted making other nuisance phone calls in the past which, as the judge recalled the boy's testimony, were "silly calls, or funny calls, or something like that." The Superior Court dismissed the writ, and appellants sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. . . . The Supreme Court handed down an elaborate and wide-ranging opinion affirming dismissal of the writ and stated the court's conclusions as to the issues raised by appellants and other aspects of the juvenile process. In their jurisdictional statement and brief in this Court, appellants do not urge upon us all of the points passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona. They urge that we hold the Juvenile Code of Arizona invalid on its face or as applied in this case because, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the juvenile is taken from the custody of his parents and committed to a state institution pursuant to proceedings in which the Juvenile Court has virtually unlimited discretion, and in which the following basic rights are denied: 1. Notice of the charges; 2. Right to counsel; 3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination; 4. Privilege against self-incrimination; 5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings; and 6. Right to appellate review. . . . From the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differences have been tolerated-- indeed even insisted upon--between the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles. In practically all jurisdictions, there are rights granted to adults which are withheld from juveniles. In addition to the specific problems involved in the present case, for example, it has been held that the juvenile is not entitled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by jury. It is frequent practice that rules governing the arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are not observed in the case of juveniles. The history and theory underlying this development are well-known, but a recapitulation is necessary for purposes of this opinion. The juvenile court movement began in this country at the end of the last century. From the Juvenile Court statute adopted in Illinois in 1899, the system has spread to every State in the Union, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The constitutionality of Juvenile Court laws has been sustained in over 40 jurisdictions against a variety of attacks. The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was "guilty" or "innocent," but "What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career." The child--especially good, as they saw it--was to be made "to feel that he is the object of [the state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be "clinical" rather than punitive. These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae. The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child. But there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence. At common law, children under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal intent. Beyond that age, they were subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment like adult offenders. In these old days, the state was not deemed to have authority to accord them fewer procedural rights than adults. The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty but to custody." He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to school, etc. If his parents default in effective performing their custodial functions--that is, if the child is "delinquent"--the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the "custody" to which the child is entitled. On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as "civil" not "criminal" and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his liberty. Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is--to say the least--debatable. And in practice, . . . the results have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts. . . ." The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness. The Chairman of the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges has recently observed: "Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court calendars, either singly or in combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due process. . . . It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal due process. As we shall discuss, the observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. But it is important, we think that the claimed benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment or folklore should cause us to shut our eyes, for example, to such startling findings as that reported in an exceptionally reliable study of repeaters or recidivism conducted by the Stanford Research Institute for the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. This Commission's Report states: In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old juveniles referred to the court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previously; 1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The SRI study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred at least twice before. * * * Certainly, these figures and the high crime rates among juveniles to which we have referred, could not lead us to conclude that the absence of constitutional protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has largely done, is effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders. We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system relating to offenders which are valuable. But the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication. For example, the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under discussion. Further, we are told that one of the important benefits of the special juvenile court procedures is that they avoid classifying the juvenile as a "criminal." The juvenile offender is now classed as a "delinquent." There is, of course, no reason why this should not continue. It is disconcerting, however, that this term has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term "criminal" applied to adults. It is also emphasized that in practically all jurisdictions, statutes provide that an adjudication of the child as a delinquent shall not operate as a civil disability or disqualify him for civil service appointment. There is no reason why the application of due process requirements should interfere with such provisions. . . . Further, it is urged that the juvenile benefits from informal proceedings in the court. The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided guidance and help "to save him from a downward career." Then, as now, goodwill and compassion were admirably prevalent. But recent studies have, with surprising unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception. They suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness--in short, the essentials of due process--may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned. . . . Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile Court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence--and of limited practical meaning--that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemestic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours. . . ." Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide. In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase "due process." Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. The traditional ideas of Juvenile Court procedure, indeed, contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it--was it a prank of adolescence or a brutal act threatening serious consequences to himself or society unless corrected? Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears to have a home, a working mother and father, and an older brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previous transgressions. Indeed, so far as appears in the record before us . . . the points to which the judge directed his attention were little different from those that would be involved in determining any charge of violation of a penal statute. The essential difference between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald's case. The summary procedure as well as the long commitment was possible because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of over 18. . . . Appellants allege that the Arizona Juvenile Code is unconstitutional or alternatively that the proceedings before the Juvenile Court were constitutionally defective because of failure to provide adequate notice of the hearings. . . . . . . Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity." It is obvious that no purpose of shielding the child from the public stigma of knowledge of his having been taken into custody and scheduled for hearing is served by the procedure approved by the court below. The "initial hearing" in the present case was a hearing on the merits. Notice at that time is not timely; and even if there were a conceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed by the court below, it would have to yield to the requirements that the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. . . . Appellants charge that the Juvenile Court proceedings were fatally defective because the court did not advise Gerald or his parents of their right to counsel, and proceeded with the hearing, the adjudication of delinquency and the order of commitment in the absence of counsel for the child and his parents or an express waiver of the right thereto. . . . A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." . . . We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. . . . Appellants urge that the writ of habeas corpus should have been granted because of the denial of the rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the Juvenile Court hearings, and because the privilege against self-incrimination was not observed. . . . The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. The roots of the privilege are, however, far deeper. They tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and--in a philosophical sense--insists upon the equality of the individual and the state. In other words, the privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the rule which prevents the use of confessions which are the product of coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability. One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction. It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is comprehensive. . . . Against the application to juveniles of the right to silence, it is argued that juvenile proceedings are "civil" and not "criminal," and therefore the privilege should not apply. It is true that the statement of the privilege in the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, is that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." However, it is also clear that the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. The privilege may, for example, be claimed in a civil or administrative proceeding, if the statement is or may be inculpatory. It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the grounds that these cannot lead to "criminal" involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings. Indeed, in over half of the States, there is no even assurance that the juvenile will be kept in separate institutions, apart from adult "criminals." In those States juveniles may be placed in or transferred to adult penal institutions after having been found "delinquent" by a juvenile court. For this purpose, at least, commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called "criminal" or "civil" And our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be "compelled" to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his liberty--a command which this Court has broadly applied and generously implemented in accordance with the teaching of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's battle for freedom. . . . We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults. We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some differences in technique--but not in principle--depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. . . . Absent a valid confession adequate to support the determination of the Juvenile Court, confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination were not essential for a finding of "delinquency. . . ." . . . We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements. Appellants urge that the Arizona statute is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because, as construed by its Supreme Court, "there is no right of appeal from a juvenile court order. . . ." The court held that there is no right to a transcript because there is no right to appeal and because the proceedings are confidential and any record must be destroyed after a prescribed period of time. Whether a transcript or other recording is made, it held, is a matter for the discretion of the juvenile court. . . . As the present case illustrates, the consequences of failure to provide an appeal, to record the proceedings, or to make findings or state the grounds for the juvenile court's conclusion may be to throw a burden upon the machinery for habeas corpus, to saddle the reviewing process with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record, and to impose upon the Juvenile Judge the unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination as to the events that transpired in the hearings before him. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black, concurring. . . . Mr. Justice White, concurring. . . . Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part. . . . Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting. The Court today uses an obscure Arizona case as a vehicle to impose upon thousands of juvenile courts throughout the Nation restrictions that the Constitution made applicable to adversary criminal trials. I believe the Court's decision is wholly unsound as a matter of constitutional law, and sadly unwise as a matter of judicial policy. Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are not civil trials. They are simply not adversary proceedings. Whether treating with a delinquent child, a neglected child, a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The object of the one is correction of a condition. The object of the other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act. In the last 70 years many dedicated men and women have devoted their professional lives to the enlightened task of bringing us out of the dark world of Charles Dickens in meeting our responsibilities to the child in our society. The result has been the creation in this century of a system of juvenile and family courts in each of the 50 States. There can be no denying that in many areas the performance of these agencies has fallen disappointingly short of the hopes and dreams of the courageous pioneers who first conceived them. For a variety of reasons, the reality has sometimes not even approached the ideal, and much remains to be accomplished in the administration of public juvenile and family agencies--in personnel, in planning, in financing, perhaps in the formulation of wholly new approaches. I possess neither the specialized experience nor the expert knowledge to predict with any certainty where may lie the brightest hope for progress in dealing with the serious problems of juvenile delinquency. But I am certain that the answer does not lie in the Court's opinion in this case, which serves to convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution. . . .

ers will almost always do this out of professional courtesy; people acting pro se might not).

Filing the motion When a plaintiff starts a civil action, they send a complaint (often in the form of a summons) to the defendant. After the defendant receives this complaint, they have twenty days to answer. In most cases, the defendant can request more time for their answer, and the plaintiff will oblige (lawyers will almost always do this out of professional courtesy; people acting pro se might not). The defendant can answer the complaint by responding with their own version of the facts, or they can file a motion to dismiss the complaint altogether. (There are a few other rarely-used motions that can be introduced in lieu of an answer to the complaint, including the motion to strike and motion for more definite statement.)

See I’mma tell you like you told me~Cash Rules everything around me~All you wanna know is (where my money at?)

And so I wantwell I for one believe the majority of you are unaware of the Student to prison pipeline renovation and Expansion to accommodate the industry the "TLR crowd" and the "WIA" created. No Wonder Bush wanted to destroy the CIA>........he created the "WIA" to do what their work do to the Tribune. It is time the Carpetbagger Aggie admit what he,I want to say he is "a sycophant" in a man's body, but that is too trite. What exactly is the reason the new aD Valorem Tax Certificates that are being "sold" to "purchasers for an obligation to pay these "purchaser's" back for the reedemable for the the face value of the certificates when it is taking money form the taxpayers to fund projects for the purchase of locking up children and the taxpayers paying for it while the taxpayers who are the "purchasers of criminalizing students". You Loyd Neal are a sorry excuse for a man. I am disgusted that you did not have to wait in line for the "face time" to meet and eat with KC and the Sunshine Band. I bet you had a bet on that game.........Carpetbagging Cheaters, if one more child gets locked up for your bullshit railroading techniques for the disgusting pathetic excuse for "Insurance" created and passed off as "Juvenile Justice" in/out via the Corpus Christi Independent School Students in the The Body of Christ . Why are you not bragging about thislien on the certificatesFinance, Finance Angler ?

Some laws, like tax laws, make ordinary conduct an offense if done without a license, stamp, or other official permission, and thus qualify legally..

....if Tax stamp is paid?!? Slim give me a call. Malum prohibitum From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search Malum prohibitum (plural mala prohibita, literal translation: "wrong because prohibited") is a Latin phrase used in law to refer to conduct that constitutes a crime only by virtue of statute, as opposed to conduct evil in and of itself, or malum in se. Conduct that was so clearly violative of society's standards for allowable conduct that it was illegal under English common law is usually regarded as "malum in se". An offense that is malum prohibitum, for example, may not appear on the face to directly violate moral standards. The distinction between these two cases is discussed in Washington v. Anderson (Supreme Court of the State of Washington, 67826-0, decided August 2000) [1]: "Criminal offenses can be broken down into two general categories -- malum in se and malum prohibitum. The distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum offenses is best characterized as follows: a malum in se offense is "naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a civilized community," whereas a malum prohibitum offense is wrong only because a statute makes it so. State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945, 946 (1905) ... "Public welfare offenses" are a subset of malum prohibitum offenses as they are typically regulatory in nature and often "'result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize.' " In debating the appropriateness of certain offenses or sanctions, one occasionally encounters the suggestion that conduct should be given more latitude on the theory that it is "merely" malum prohibitum. In an earlier version of this document, it was suggested that examples of malum prohibitum included parking violations and copyright violations (which, respectively, are at least arguably a form of trespass and a form of theft). Some laws, like tax laws, make ordinary conduct an offense if done without a license, stamp, or other official permission, and thus qualify as malum prohibitum. On the other hand, licensing is sometimes done for safety purposes (to prevent untrained drivers' operation of powerful motorized vehicles where the public is at risk, or to ensure that persons without minimum qualifications are not permitted to practice medicine or act as architects or sell services as a member of another licensed profession), and to prevent certain frauds or egregious violations of trust from being too easy; violation of such licensing rules, by virtue of the peril the conduct creates, arguably prevents such prohibitions from being merely malum prohibitum. For example, the risk to the public if one were not required to have a license and post a bond before issuing life insurance policies is so severe that purporting to sell life insurance while conducting an unlicensed, unbonded business is arguably tantamount to fraud. Because the definition given in Anderson depends on the 'sense of a civilized community', it is certain that the specific categorization of offenses as malum prohibitum and malum in se will be subject to debate whenever there is debate within the community as to what should violate the sensibilities of its members.

Tampering with the Government documents...................

.community .commons .comparison .combat .comprehend .compatriots .commerce .company John Kerry Impeach Bush Bushgate GOP Lies Bush's Scrubbers Stolen Election 2000 Florida-gate Bush's Scrubbers Richard Nixon was obsessed with leaks from within his administration, and his secret team of "plumbers" worked to stop these leaks, breaking the law as they went about their dirty business. George W. Bush is obsessed with any public record that documents illegal, unethical, or embarrassing activities. He has a secret team of "scrubbers" who make sure such records mysteriously "disappear" from government offices and newspaper websites. Here are some records that have disappeared. If you find more, please e-mail public@democrats.com. Please note: long URL's often get chopped up in e-mail transmissions, so be sure you have attempted to "reassemble" a long URL before sending it to us. Also use the search feature of any site you visit, because an old article may have been archived with a different URL. Austin Chronicle: W's Paper Chase Scrubbed: January 2001 George Orwell Bush has repeatedly attempted (and too often succeeded) in scrubbing public records that are embarassing or worse (see http://democrats.com/display.cfm?id=220). But here's the most astonishing scrub we've encountered yet - Bush is trying to scrub the ENTIRE RECORD OF HIS 6 YEARS AS GOVERNOR OF TEXAS! How is this possible? Back in January, Bush snuck ALL of his records into Papa Bush's Presidential Library. And now he won't let Texas archivists anywhere near them. Why is he hiding them? Perhaps there's proof of crimes committed during Funeralgate - and perhaps there are many other scandals we've never heard about. We demand an investigation! White House Press Office: Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer Scrubbed: 9/26/01 Unscrubbed: 10/6/01-11/27/01 If you listen to the recording of Ari Fleischer's press briefing on 9/26, you can clearly hear Fleischer answer the question about Bill Maher's remarks by saying: "they need to WATCH WHAT THEY SAY, watch what they do." (Click "Listen to the Briefing" and advance to 31 minutes 21 seconds.) But if you read the official transcript, "watch what you say" has been removed. Once again, the White House is scrubbing official records to hide embarrassing behavior. We demand an investigation! MSNBC Scrubs GOP Censorship Story Scrubbed: 9/24/01 Unscrubbed: 9/25/01 On September 24, MSNBC reported that Republican House staffers ordered C-SPAN cameras removed from Judiciary Committee hearings when Democrats called civil liberties advocates to testify. On September 25, this MSNBC article was re-written, and this section was completely removed. Rumpus Online: O Daughter, Where Art Thou Posted 4/?/01 - Scrubbed 4/12/01 In early April, an irreverent student publication at Yale called "The Rumpus" published an account of two episodes when Barbara Bush's secret service detail lost track of her. A few days later, the Rumpus editors were hauled before Dean of Student Affairs Betty Trachtenberg. Immediately following the meeting, the article was scrubbed. Conservatives made a federal case for decades about the abuse of Yale's "free speech" policy following protests against racist theorist William Shockley in 1974, but have not uttered a word in protest over this gross violation. FlashPhotography.com: Texas Christian University Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity party photos Posted 2/25/01 - Scrubbed 3/3/01 - Unscrubbed 3/9/01 A picture of 19-year-old Jenna Bush, taken at the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity bash that resulted in the arrest of Jenna's boyfriend for public intoxication, was scrubbed from the flashphotography.com web site. Flash Photography was hired to take photos at the event and, and posts the photos on its password-protected site for partygoers to purchase. White House officials tried to deny that Jenna was at the party, and the photo of Jenna was mysteriously removed after being posted for several days. White House spokeswoman Claire Buchan said the Bush administration had nothing to do with the picture's removal. "To my knowledge, there was no contact of any kind" with the photo company, she said Friday. Buchan is lying - we demand an investigation! White House Press Office: Transcript of President Bush's First Press Conference Posted and Scrubbed 2/22/01 CocoaGate: White House Scrubs the 'Cocoa' Bushism. During Bush's first press conference, he said a number of incoherent things. One that was the butt of many jokes was his reference to the cultivation of "cocoa" leaves in Columbia. (Listen to the audio for yourself at 19:26.) Well, somehow "cocoa" was changed to "coca" when the official White House transcript was posted. Tampering with government documents is a crime - we demand an investigation! The London Observer: Best Democracy Money can Buy Posted 11/26/2000 - Scrubbed 2/21/01 - Unscrubbed here When Papa Bush left the White House, he gave a sweetheart deal to the Canadian company Barrick Goldstrike. Bush gave them mining rights for US land with an estimated $10 Billion in gold for only $10 Thousand. Oh and by the way, the company then hired Papa Bush after he left office where he was on the payroll till 1999. The company also donated $148,000 to the Republican Party. Unfortunately, you can't read this story any more at the Guardian because Barrick Goldstrike has threatened a lawsuit. But you can still read it here. MSNBC: The Funeral Home Flap Trouble for a Texas mortician with links to the Bush family Posted 8/16/99 - Scrubbed 2/9/01 - Unscrubbed here This article suddenly disappeared from MSNBC's web site on February 9, 2001 - the day Democrats.com published a major expose on Funeralgate. This follows the disappearance of several other articles unfavorable to George W. Bush, most notably: a) the Washington Post article by Al Kamen identifying the Republican thugs who stopped the Miami recount (reposted following inquiries by a Democrats.com member), and b) the CNN Crossfire transcript where Larry Flynt charged Bush with helping his girlfriend get an abortion in the early 1970's. It took the Watergate scandal to expose Nixon's "plumbers" - it looks like Funeralgate will expose Bush's "scrubbers". Washington Post: The Miami-Dade Rioters Article by Al Kamen identifying the Republican thugs who stopped the Miami recount Posted 12/6/00 - Scrubbed circa 12/21/00 - Unscrubbed circa 1/1/01 (following inquiries from a member of Democrats.com) Remember the thugs who rioted in the Miami-Dade elections office and stopped the manual recount of 10,000 undervotes? This one criminal event probably stole the election for Bush. But please try to forget it, because the Washington Post doesn't want you to remember this ominous event. On December 6, the link below showed a photo of the leaders, current and former Republican Congressional staffers. Now it's gone - straight out of Orwell. If you don't want this event to disappear down the memory hole, here's the full list, courtesy of bushwatch.com: 1. Tom Pyle, policy analyst, office of House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.). 2. Garry Malphrus, majority chief counsel and staff director, House Judiciary subcommittee on criminal justice. 3. Rory Cooper, political division staff member at the National Republican Congressional Committee. 4. Kevin Smith, former House Republican conference analyst and more recently of Voter.com. 5. Steven Brophy, former aide to Sen. Fred D. Thompson (R-Tenn.), now working at the consulting firm KPMG. 6. Matt Schlapp, former chief of staff for Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R-Kan.), now on the Bush campaign staff in Austin. 7. Roger Morse, aide to Rep. Van Hilleary (R-Tenn.). 8. Duane Gibson, aide to Chairman Don Young (R-Alaska) of the House Resources Committee. 9. Chuck Royal, legislative assistant to Rep. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.). 10. Layna McConkey, former legislative assistant to former Rep. Jim Ross Lightfoot (R-Iowa), now at Steelman Health Strategies. These individuals should be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and ethics complaints should be filed against the Members of Congress who employ them. CNN Crossfire: Larry Flynt Discusses Bush's Abortion Posted 10/20/00 - Scrubbed 10/21/00 - Unscrubbed here On CNN's Crossfire on October 20, Larry Flynt exploded a bombshell: that he has evidence that George W. Bush was "involved in an abortion in Texas" in the early 1970's - when abortions were still illegal. Amazingly, CNN has censored its own story!!!! This has all the markings of a cover-up by CNN - just like the cover-ups of Bush's many other scandals, from going AWOL, to using illegal drugs, to corruption in Texas government, to lying under oath. Democrats.com: Bush Aides Possibly Altered National Guard Records To Conceal Grounding and Missed Duty Aides to Texas Governor George W. Bush visited the Air National Guard archives at Camp Mabry in 1997 and possibly altered Bush's military service records to conceal Bush's grounding from flight in 1972 and subsequent missed duty, according to a former senior official of the Texas National Guard. 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I get a strange magic...........Strange

You're sailing softly through the sun in a broken stone age dawn. You fly so high. I get a strange magic, oh, what a strange magic, oh, it's a strange magic. Got a strange magic, got a strange magic. You're walking meadows in my mind, making waves across my time, oh no, oh no. I get a strange magic, oh, what a strange magic, oh, it's a strange magic. Got a strange magic, got a strange magic. Oh, I'm never gonna be the same again, now I've seen the way it's got to end, sweet dream, sweet dream. Strange magic, oh, what a strange magic, oh, it's a strange magic. Got a strange magic, got a strange magic. It's magic, it's magic, it's magic. Strange magic, oh, what a strange magic, oh, it's a strange magic. Got a strange magic. Strange magic STRANGE MAGIC oh, what a strange magic STRANGE MAGIC oh, it's a strange magic. Got a strange magic. Strange magic STRANGE MAGIC oh, what a strange magic STRANGE MAGIC oh, it's a strange magic. Got a strange magic, got a strange magic, you know I got a strange magic, yeah, I got a strange magic, oo-o-o-oo, strange magic. (fade)

The Court of Criminal Appeals hears death penalty cases directly .....if they have the time but not @after 5:01 P.M. M-F, closed weekends

Back to Law & the Media home page Back to The Criminal Process home page The Criminal Process The Court System: Jurisdiction Municipal Court Within general law cities (defined by the legislature as cities with 5,000 or less population) the mayor may serve as city judge. When the city has a separate judge he or she may be appointed by the city council or elected by the people. Within home rule cities(defined by legislature as cities with 5,000 or more population with a charter) the judge or judges of the municipal court are usually appointed by the city council. Municipal courts are usually called city courts in general law cities and may be called traffic, city or municipal courts in home rule cities. The municipal court has jurisdiction within the territorial limits of the city in all cases involving violation of city ordinances. The court has concurrent jurisdiction with the justice of the peace courts of the precincts in which the city is situated in all criminal cases arising under the criminal laws of the state where the punishment is by fine only and does not exceed $200. Justice of the Peace Courts The county commissioners court, as the governing body of the county, must establish between one and eight precincts in each county in the state depending on the population of the county. The commissioners may designate two places in any one precinct if population warrants. Justices of the peace are elected for four years. A constable may be elected for each precinct or place. Constable positions may remain vacant and constables may serve more than one precinct. Justices of the peace have original jurisdiction in Class C misdemeanors. Appeals may be made to county courts. Even though a record may be kept, neither the municipal court nor the justice court is a court of record. Primarily this means that the testimony is not recorded by a court reporter and on appeal cases are retried as if the first trial did not exist. This is called trial de novo. This means that reporters must be careful in handling coverage of events in lower courts, such as corporation and justice courts. An example is bond forfeiture. A person arrested for an offense may put up a cash bond and fail to appear for trial, at which time the bond may be forfeited. The disposition must be reported in that manner. Justices of the peace may also conduct examining trials, imprison for nonpayment of fines and costs to enforce their authority, issue peace bonds, issue search warrants, set bonds in felonies and hold hearings in bond contests. They also sit as judges of small claims court (small claims involve debts to $50 and wages and labor to $100 and the JP may command a court fee for settlement), handle civil matters where the amount in question is $200 or less. They may hold inquests and—if the county has no medical examiner—order an autopsy. They may also conduct marriages, for which they expect to be paid. Justices of the peace do not have to be lawyers. County Courts County judges preside over county courts in some counties and in other counties courts-at-law have been established to handle civil and criminal cases. In criminal matters, county courts have jurisdiction in misdemeanors. Cases may also be appealed from the municipal or justice courts to the county courts. Appeals from the county courts in misdemeanor cases are taken to the court of criminal appeals. County courts handle matters of probate, appoint guardians of minors, declare persons non compos mentis (not of sound mind), settle accounts of executors and transact business pertaining to deceased persons. Under the mental health code, county courts may commit a person to a mental ward or hospital for 90 days. The legislature may provide for courts-at-law to handle criminal and civil matters. Probate courts may be established in the same manner. In counties where courts-at-law and/or probate courts have been established, the county judge may sit only at commissioners court (the meeting of the county commissioners) and handle the administrative duties of the county or may handle only some probate and mental health matters. County judges, especially in smaller counties, may handle juvenile cases. Or another judge, usually in district court, may be designated to handle juvenile cases. Larger counties have juvenile courts. County judges are required to be knowledgeable in the law, but they do not have to be lawyers. Judges of courts-at-law must be lawyers. All are elected and all elected county officials serve four-year terms. District Courts District courts have been established by the legislature throughout the state according to caseload demands. They, as county courts, are established by the legislature upon request from county commissioners. A district may include more than one county, a single county or a county may have more than one district court. Larger counties have separate criminal and civil courts. District courts have jurisdiction in felony cases. They also handle misdemeanors involving officials misconduct. District court judges preside over courts of inquiry. District judges must be lawyers and are elected for four years. Courts of Appeals Courts of Appeal came into being on September 1, 1981, to replace the Courts of Civil Appeals. The new courts have jurisdiction over both civil and criminal matters. The purpose of the change was to relieve the overcrowding of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which previously was the only appellate criminal court. Misdemeanors are appealed directly from the county courts to a court of appeals. Felonies are appealed from district courts. Texas has 14 courts of appeals with varying numbers of justices, depending on case loads. Court of Criminal Appeals This is the highest appellate court in Texas for handling of criminal cases. Its equivalent in civil law is the Supreme Court of Texas. Nine judges (so called as opposed to the term justices for the Supreme Court) preside. They serve overlapping six-year terms and are elected state-wide. One of the nine is elected presiding judge. The Court of Criminal Appeals hears death penalty cases directly from district court. Both the state and convicted person may appeal the decision of a court of appeals, but the high court may decline to hear a case without writing an opinion. The Court of Criminal Appeals also has the right to review a case from a court of appeals on its own motion if it thinks the case is important enough to rule on. Courts on Line Excellent information about the Texas court system is available on line at www.courts.state.tx.us/